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Abstract: Consistent with mental accounting, we document that investors sometimes choose the 
asset allocation for one account without considering the asset allocation of their other accounts. 
The setting is a firm that changed its 401(k) matching rules. Initially, 401(k) enrollees chose the 
allocation of their own contributions, but the firm chose the match allocation. These enrollees 
ignored the match allocation when choosing their own-contribution allocation. In the second 
regime, enrollees simultaneously selected both DFFRXQWV¶allocations, leading them to mentally 
integrate the two. Own-contribution allocations before the rule change equal the combined own- 
and match-contribution allocations afterwards, whereas combined allocations differ sharply 
across regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James J. Choi            David Laibson 
Yale School of Management        Department of Economics 
135 Prospect Street          Harvard University 
P.O. Box 208200          Littauer Center 
New Haven, CT 06520-8200       Cambridge, MA 02138 
james.choi@yale.edu         dlaibson@harvard.edu   
 
 
Brigitte C. Madrian         
Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
79 JFK Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
brigitte_madrian@harvard.edu   3 
  This paper documents a lack of coordination between the asset allocations of different 
financial accounts in a household portfolio. Our findings are predicted by the theory of mental 
accounting (Richard H. Thaler 1985, 1990, 1999): agents sometimes make decisions about 
individual accounts in their portfolio without considering their other accounts. 
The setting for our analysis is a large U.S. firm. When an employee at this firm makes a 
401(k) contribution, the company makes a matching contribution proportional WRWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
contribution (up to a match threshold). In March 2003, the firm changed its 401(k) matching 
rules, creating a natural experiment. Both before and after the rule change, the initial allocation 
of participants¶RZQ-contribution flows was determined by the participants.
1 The change in 
March 2003 was to the policy determining the initial asset allocation of the employer match 
contributions.  
In the first regime (before March 2003), the firm directed matching contribution flows 
entirely into employer stock. This was not a binding restriction, as participants could freely 
reallocate their match balances after matching contributions were made (although in practice 
participants rarely did so). In March 2003, the company changed its match policy, requiring new 
enrollees to actively choose the asset allocation for both their own- and match-contribution 
flows.  
The change between these regimes was economically neutral; any allocation of balances 
in one regime could be replicated in the other. Nevertheless, allocations to employer stock 
differed vastly across the two regimes. Employees who enrolled in February 2003²just before 
the regime change²allocated 23% of their own-contribution flows to employer stock. Since all 
of their match contributions were directed into employer stock, this resulted in a 56% total 
                                                 
1 We draw a distinction between the asset allocation for contribution flows and the asset allocation for balances. The 
former is the mix of assets in which incremental 401(k) contributions are initially invested. The latter is the mix of 
all accumulated assets currently held in the portfolio.    4 
401(k) allocation to employer stock (combining the own-contribution and match-contribution 
accounts). Few of these February enrollees made subsequent trades to reduce their employer 
stock balances in either account. Employees who enrolled in March 2003²right after the 
change²allocated 23% of their total (own- plus match-contribution) flows to employer stock. 
Notice that own-contribution allocations to employer stock in the first regime precisely match 
the combined allocation of own- and match-contributions in the second regime (23% in both 
cases), even though combined allocations differ greatly across the regimes. 
These results imply that each dollar of employer stock contributed to enrollees through 
the match in the first regime increased the employeHV¶ total holdings of employer stock by a full 
dollar, rather than being offset by reduced employer stock holdings elsewhere or being sold off 
directly,QRWKHUZRUGV³PRQH\VWLFNVZKHUHLWKLWV´(a phrase attributed to Arthur Okun), 
generating an asset allocation flypaper effect that is akin to the flypaper effects of public finance, 
corporate finance, and intra-household consumption.
2 
After considering several explanations for the asset allocation flypaper effect, we 
conclude that it is due in part to mental accounting. Our results can be explained by the following 
simple model. In the first regime, new enrollees actively allocated only their own-contribution 
flows, effectively ignoring the fact that their matching contributions were entirely directed into 
employer stock. In the second regime, the match allocation became salient because new enrollees 
were required to choose both their match and own-contribution allocations during the enrollment 
process. This caused enrollees to consider their entire 401(k) portfolio instead of just their own-
contribution accounts. As a result, the fraction of total contributions allocated to employer stock 
under the second regime equaled the fraction of own-contribution flows allocated to employer 
                                                 
2 See James R. Hines and Thaler (1995) for a review of the flypaper literature, and Esther Duflo and Christopher 
Udry (2004) for evidence on the flypaper effect in intra-household consumption.   5 
stock under the first regime; the average participant allocated roughly one-quarter of assets to 
employer stock in whatever accounts were salient, whether the set of salient accounts was 
narrow (regime one) or broad (regime two). The dependence of portfolio outcomes on account 
salience is inconsistent with investors having a clear target asset allocation for their entire 
portfolio which they efficiently implement through their investment choices. 
In accordance with much prior research, we also find that investors are quite passive, 
rarely reallocating their portfolios.
3 However, our central finding concerns asset allocation 
decisions made at enrollment²a point when people have overcome their passivity and are taking 
action. Investor passivity thus cannot account for the unresponsiveness of own-contribution 
allocations to the match allocation at enrollment under the first regime, although passivity helps 
explain why these initial decisions are rarely reversed subsequently. 
I. 401(k) Savings Plan Features at a Large U.S. Corporation 
  The company whose employees we study is a large publicly traded firm in the retail 
sector. Employees must actively opt into 401(k) savings plan participation. The company offers 
an employer match of 150% on the first 1% of pay contributed and 50% on the next 4% of pay 
contributed. At year-end 2005, 59% of eligible employees participated in the company 401(k). 
Other features of the 401(k) plan are listed in Web Appendix Table C1. 
  Before March 2003, all 401(k) matching contributions were directed by the firm into 
employer stock, although after the match was received, participants could trade out of employer 
stock and into any of the other available investment options. At the beginning of March 2003, the 
company implemented the policy change studied in this paper: it ceased requiring that 401(k) 
                                                 
3 See, for example, William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988), Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea 
(2001), James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick (2002, 2004a), Julie Agnew, 
Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika Sundén (2003), John Ameriks and Stephen P. Zeldes (2004), Choi, Laibson, and 
Madrian (2005a,b), and Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Steven P. Utkus, and Takeshi Yamaguchi (2006).   6 
participants accept matching contributions entirely in employer stock. Going forward, new 
participants were required upon enrollment to actively choose an asset allocation for their 
matching contribution flows, just as they did for their own-contribution flows. Employees who 
had enrolled prior to March 2003 were not required after this plan change to actively specify an 
asset allocation for future matching contribution flows, although they had the option to do so. If 
tKH\GLGQRWPDNHDQDFWLYHHOHFWLRQWKHFRPSDQ\FRQWLQXHGWRGLUHFWWKHVHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
matching contributions entirely into employer stock. Note that this plan change was neutral. Any 
allocation of balances²the allocation that determines investment returns²that was feasible in 
the new regime could have been implemented under the old regime.  
II. Data 
Our data are a series of year-end cross-sections from 2002 to 2004 of all employees 
eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan at the study company. These data contain demographic 
information such as birth date, hire date, gender, and compensation. They also contain 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶VN account, including date of first participation, monthly 
contribution rates, annual contributions to each investment option, and year-end balances for 
each investment option. The contribution flow and balance allocation information is reported 
separately for the own-contribution and the match accounts. We also make limited use of cross-
sectional data from year-end 1998.
4 
We impose three restrictions to obtain the participant sample used in our analysis. First, 
we consider only employees who enrolled in the plan between November 1998 and December 
2004; we exclude participants who enrolled before November 1998 because the plan match was 
significantly changed at that time. Second, we drop 401(k) participants who are ineligible for 
                                                 
4 The 1998 data are only available for a random sub-sample of employees who were at the firm at year-end 1998.   7 
matching contributions²those who do not yet have 12 months of tenure at the company and 
1,000 hours of service.
5 Finally, we purge the data of participants who are likely to have joined 
the company as a result of acquisitions made by the firm because these individuals may not be 
comparable to employees who joined the company organically.
6 Our results are qualitatively 
similar, however, even if we include participants who were potentially acquired. 
III. Empirical Results 
  Figure 1 shows the SODQFKDQJH¶Vimpact on the employer stock allocation of savings plan 
participants. The solid lines represent, by month of plan enrollment (the x-axis), the average 
fraction of contribution flows in 2003 WKDWZDVDOORFDWHGWRHPSOR\HUVWRFNIRUHPSOR\HHV¶RZQ
contributions (the grey line) and matching contributions (the black line).
7 Similarly, the dashed 
lines show contribution flow allocations to employer stock in 2004. 
We first consider the matching contribution allocations to employer stock in 2003 and 
2004 (the solid and dashed black lines). A sharp discontinuity is readily apparent between 
participants enrolling before the plan change and those enrolling afterwards. Among participants 
who enrolled between November 1998 and February 2003, the average fraction of matching 
contributions allocated to employer stock was 98% in 2003 and 94% in 2004. There is 
remarkably little variation in this average by enrollment month. In contrast, participants who 
enrolled in the savings plan in March 2003 or later allocated a much lower fraction of their 
                                                 
5 Before April 2003, employees were eligible to participate in the 401(k) starting 12 months after hire, provided they 
had worked at least 1,000 hours at the company. In April 2003, this eligibility requirement was reduced to 90 days 
of employment, although eligibility for the employer match was still restricted to those with 12 months of tenure and 
1,000 hours of service. This eligibility change affects savings plan participation for employees with lower levels of 
tenure, and one might worry that it confounds our estimates of the March 2003 plan change effect. We will show in 
Section III, however, that our results are virtually identical when we restrict the sample to an enrollment window 
over which eligibility requirements were constant. 
6 Unfortunately, our data do not explicitly identify how employees joined the firm. To screen out acquired 
individuals, we drop employees whose initial appearance in our data is later than when they would have become 
eligible to participate if they were organically hired full-time employees, given their coded hire date. 
7 All figures weight each employee equally. Analogous figures with dollar-weighted averages are qualitatively 
similar and are available from the authors by request.   8 
matching contribution flow to employer stock: 34% on average in 2003 and 35% in 2004. The 
high match allocation to employer stock among pre-March 2003 enrollees is due to the fact that 
at enrollment, these participants were required to receive their match entirely in employer stock. 
Even after this restriction was lifted, few elected to change their match allocation²only 9% of 
pre-March 2003 enrollees as of year-end 2004, 22 months after the plan change. Post-March 
2003 enrollees, in contrast, faced no restriction against choosing a match flow allocation at the 
time of enrollment. 
Turning to HPSOR\HHV¶own contribution flows, we find that the average fraction allocated 
to employer stock across all enrollment cohorts was 37% in 2003 (the grey solid line) and 34% 
in 2004 (the grey dashed line). As with the match account, most of the variation in own-
contribution flow allocations across enrollment cohorts reflects variation in allocation decisions 
made at the time of enrollment, since few participants change their allocation afterwards. 
Between 2003 and 2004, 87% of participants observed in both years kept the same own-
contribution allocation to employer stock. Even among November to December 1998 enrollees 
who remained at the firm five years later, 76% had the same own-contribution allocation to 
employer stock in both 1998 and 2003. Consistent with the findings of Shlomo Benartzi (2001) 
and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2004b), the own-contribution flow allocation to 
employer stock is higher for participants ZKRHQUROOHGZKHQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVWRFNKDGSHUIRUPHG
well in the recent past. (To maintain the anonymity of the study company, stock market 
performance is not shown.) 
There is no reason to believe that individuals enrolling immediately before the plan 
change had systematically different investment preferences than those enrolling immediately 
afterwards. Web Appendix Table C2 shows that the demographic characteristics of employees   9 
enrolling before and after the plan change are quite similar.
8 If the presumption of comparable 
investment preferences is correct, then both groups should have roughly the same target for their 
total employer stock portfolio share, and the higher match allocation to employer stock for the 
pre-change enrollees should have been offset by a decrease in their own-contribution allocation 
to employer stock. This is not what we observe. Own-contribution allocations to employer stock 
are unresponsive to the high employer stock match allocations LQGXFHGE\WKHILUVWUHJLPH¶V
matching rule. The result is a flypaper effect: each dollar of employer stock received in the 
match account under the first regime raised total employer stock contributions by a full dollar, 
rather than crowding out employer stock contributions in other accounts. 
  The top panel of Table 1 shows the magnitude of the effect that the plan change had on 
contribution flows allocated to employer stock. If we measure the effect of the plan change by 
comparing employees who enrolled one month before the plan change (February 2003 enrollees) 
to those who enrolled in the first month after the plan change (March 2003 enrollees), we obtain 
a 67.9 percentage point decline in the fraction of matching contribution flows allocated to 
employer stock. Broadening the before and after groups to include employees who enrolled in 
the two months before and the two months after the plan change, or the six months before and 
the six months after the plan change, yields very similar estimates of 67.6 and 66.5 percentage 
points respectively. Instead of offsetting the high match flows to employer stock under the first 
regime, own-contribution flows to employer stock are actually a bit higher before than after the 
change (1.8 to 3.3 percentage points, depending on the comparison groups). The result is that the 
                                                 
8 The number of post-March 2003 enrollees exceeds pre-March 2003 enrollees due to seasonal enrollment patterns 
FRXSOHGZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VJURZLQJVL]HRYHUWKHVDPSOHSHULRG(QUROOHHV¶DYHUDJHDVVHWDOORFDWLRQVGRQRWIROORZ
a seasonal pattern when there are no plan changes, indicating that seasonality does not confound our plan change 
effect estimates.   10 
combined own- and match contribution flow allocations to employer stock differ by 33.4, 33.2, 
and 31.3 percentage points using the one-, two-, and six-month comparison groups. 
  Interestingly, pre-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶DYHUDJHown-contribution allocation to employer 
stock and post-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶DYHUDJHtotal contribution allocation to employer stock are 
nearly identical; the two numbers are no more than a percentage point apart, regardless of the 
comparison groups used. Web Appendix Figure C1 shows that not only the means, but also the 
distributions are virtually identical when comparing pre-March 2003 enrolleHV¶own-contribution 
employer stock allocations and post-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶total contribution allocations.  
  Even though contribution flow allocations differ dramatically between those enrolling 
after the plan change and those enrolling before, the allocation of balances, not flows, ultimately 
determines portfolio returns. It is possible that employees were reallocating their 401(k) assets 
after contributions were made in order to undo the discrepancies in flow allocations. Recall that 
even prior to March 2003, employees could freely transfer their accumulated match balances out 
of employer stock.  
Figure 2 shows that such ex post rebalancing was not an important factor. The fraction of 
total balances held in employer stock at year-ends 2003 and 2004 looks remarkably similar to the 
contribution flow allocations in Figure 1. For employees who enrolled prior to March 2003, the 
vast majority of match balances are invested in employer stock even at year-end 2004, 22 months 
after the plan change. This finding is consistent with the results of Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
(2005b) who document that when employees are given the ability to diversify match balances out 
of employer stock, few actually do. The fact that balance allocations closely track flow 
allocations even for those who enrolled early in the sample period (e.g. 1998) demonstrates that   11 
flow allocation decisions are not much more likely to be reversed as 401(k) balances grow larger 
and the absolute dollar consequences of the 401(k) asset allocation increase. 
  The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the estimated impact of the 2003 plan change on the 
balances held in employer stock. As suggested by Figure 2, the balance results are nearly 
identical to the contribution flow results. The fraction of match balances held in employer stock 
falls by between 65.7 and 67.6 percentage points²an effect only slightly smaller than that 
measured for contribution flow allocations²whereas the fraction of own-contribution balances 
held in employer stock falls by 1.8 to 3.8 percentage points. Integrating the own-contribution and 
match accounts, the impact on total 401(k) balances is a 32.0 to 34.2 percentage point reduction 
in employer stock holdings. 
  We have estimated the regression-adjusted impact of the plan change for each of the 
comparison groups and accounts listed in Table 1, controlling for demographic characteristics.
9 
These unreported results differ little from the raw effects. We also find that the magnitude of the 
flypaper effect is similar across different demographic subgroups. Of particular note, even 
higher-income participants²who are likely to be more financially literate²exhibit a flypaper 
effect comparable to the company-wide average flypaper effect. Finally, the magnitude of the 
flypaper effect is similar if we restrict the sample to participants whose matching contributions 
are fully vested upon enrollment, suggesting that the effect does not arise simply because 
unvested participants do not value the employer match and thus pay little attention to it.
10 
                                                 
9 The regression-adjusted results control for gender, marital status, age, tenure, income, and plan balances. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
10 Participants are 100% vested in their employer matching contributions once they attain 3 years of service.   12 
IV. Discussion 
What drives the asset allocation flypaper effect? We consider several potential 
explanations and conclude that it is not possible to explain the effects without mental accounting.  
Prior to the plan change, enrollees made an asset allocation decision for only their own-
contribution flows. Therefore, it was psychologically natural to put own-contributions into a 
segregated mental account and to make flow allocation decisions for these contributions while 
ignoring the match flow allocation. After the plan change, enrollees were forced to choose 
allocations for both accounts, which made both accounts salient and encouraged their integration 
into a unified mental account.  
Consistent with this story, participants who enrolled in the 401(k) just before March 2003 
allocated about 23% of their own-contribution flows to employer stock, whereas those enrolling 
just after allocated about 23% of their combined contribution flows to employer stock. This 
suggests that the average participant desires to allocate one quarter of his 401(k) assets to 
employer stock in whatever portfolios are salient, whether the set of salient portfolios is narrow 
or broad. This domain-invariance applies not only to the mean, but also to the across-employee 
distribution of allocations to employer stock. 
In line with past research, we document extensive passivity among investors. Asset 
allocation decisions made at enrollment are only infrequently altered afterwards. However, 
passivity cannot account for choices made at enrollment. An employee in the process of 
enrolling in her 401(k) plan has momentarily overcome passivity. The cost of explicitly stating 
an asset allocation preference is already sunk, so there is no reason not to choose an allocation 
that is closest to what the employee thinks optimal. An enrollee before March 2003 could have 
reduced the fraction of her own contributions allocated to employer stock upon enrollment to   13 
compensate for the fact that all of her matching contributions would be made in employer stock. 
Instead, we see that own-contribution allocations to employer stock among pre-March 2003 
enrollees are similar to own-contribution allocations among post-March 2003 enrollees, even 
though post-March 2003 enrollees allocate less than a third of their matching contributions to 
employer stock. Passivity does, however, help explain why the influence of salience at the point 
of enrollment is so persistent afterwards. 
There are three other potential explanations for the flypaper effect, none of which can 
completely explain the magnitude of the results documented above. The first is the short-sales 
constraint imposed by the 401(k). Suppose pre-March 2003 enrollees wanted to reduce their 
own-contribution flow allocation to employer stock in order to offset the direction of the match 
into employer stock. In a 401(k) plan, however, participants cannot allocate less than zero to 
employer stock in their own-contribution flows; they cannot sell short. If they are unaware that 
they can trade out of the employer stock in their match account or unwilling to do so, they are 
³FRQVWUDLQHG´WRKROGDODUJHIUDFWLRQRIWKHLUSRUWIROLRLQHPSOR\HUVWRFN 
Once employees were allowed to specify the asset allocation for their matching 
contribution flows, this short-sales constraint was effectively relaxed and participants could hold 
less employer stock. Web Appendix A calculates how much employer stock allocations would be 
expected to drop after the plan change if only a short-sales constraint were responsible for the 
flypaper effect. We find that such a constraint cannot quantitatively generate the drop we 
actually observe. Furthermore, this short-sales constraint explanation predicts that the prevalence 
of 0% own-contribution employer stock allocations among the pre-March 2003 cohort would be 
considerably higher than the prevalence of 0% total employer stock allocations among the post-
March 2003 cohort, since pre-March enrollees who desire a 0% total allocation are a strict subset   14 
of constrained pre-March employees. In fact, the frequency of 0% own-contribution allocations 
before March is nearly identical to the frequency of 0% total allocations afterwards, consistent 
with a mental accounting story but not with a short-sales constraint story. 
A second potential explanation is that enrollees before the plan change ignored the match 
DOORFDWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHXQDZDUHRIWKHPDWFK¶VH[LVWHQFH or its asset allocation. Of course, 
without direct measurement of participant knowledge about the match, mental accounting in the 
first regime is observationally equivalent to participant ignorance about the match. In Web 
Appendix B, we calculate that in order for ignorance alone to generate a flypaper effect large 
enough to match the data, at least 92% of enrollees under the first regime must have been 
ignorant. Although some ignorance is likely, 92% seems an implausibly large fraction of 
participants who are unaware of a major, frequently advertised feature of their 401(k) plan. 
A final potential explanation for the flypaper effect is that employees perceived the plan 
FKDQJHDVUHPRYLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLPSOLFLWHQGRUVHPHQWRILWVVWRFNDVDQDWWUDFWLYHLQYHVWPHQW
The perception of such an endorsement could explain why so few participants diversified out of 
employer stock in their match account before the plan change. And the removal of the 
endorsement could have generated the large drop in employer stock allocations after the change. 
Past research has documented the existence of such endorsement effects (Benartzi 2001; 
Madrian and Shea 2001; Jeffrey R. Brown, Nellie Liang, and Scott Weisbenner 2007; John 
Beshears et al. 2008). It is plausible that our participants preferred a higher contribution 
allocation to employer stock before the plan change than after. However, the endorsement effect 
magnitudes found in other studies are much smaller than the 33 percentage point effect that 
resulted from the regime change studied in the current paper. It would also be a remarkable 
coincidence if the plan change generated an endorsement effect at our company that by itself   15 
caused total employer stock allocations among post-March 2003 enrollees to almost exactly 
equal the own-contribution employer stock allocations among pre-March 2003 enrollees.  
Moreover, participant behavior after the plan change is inconsistent with an endorsement 
effect of such a large magnitude. If employer stock was perceived to be much less attractive 
starting in March 2003, there should have been a corresponding change in the asset allocation of 
pre-March 2003 enrollees. Despite high levels of passivity, some participants do make changes, 
and Gabriel D. Carroll et al. (2008) find that 401(k) participants opt out of the status quo more 
often when the status quo becomes less attractive to them. But we find no evidence that trading 
out of employer stock increased following the plan change. Likewise, among those who did trade 
out of employer stock, we find no evidence that the size of the net transfers out increased. (See 
Web Appendix Figures C2 and C3.) It therefore seems unlikely that an endorsement effect 
accounts for a large portion of the plan change effect.  
  Note that the latter two explanations work against each other. A large endorsement effect 
implies that most participants know what their match asset allocation is, ruling out extreme 
ignorance. If ignorance and endorsement effects coexist, then each limits the size of the other. 
  Our mental accounting evidence has implications for the interpretation of a growing body 
of empirical research that examines asset allocations in only one set of financial accounts, such 
as 401(k) or retail brokerage accounts.
11 One concern is that choices in these accounts that 
DSSHDULUUDWLRQDOLQLVRODWLRQPD\EHMXVWLILHGE\RIIVHWWLQJHIIHFWVLQWKHUHVWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
portfolio. Although we do not observe the entire portfolio of individuals in this paper, we do 
observe two separate accounts and document DODFNRIFRRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQWKRVHDFFRXQWV¶
                                                 
11 Examples include Terrance Odean (1998), Brad Barber and Odean (2000), Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002, 2004a), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003), Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
(2005a,b), Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006), Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), and William 
Goetzmann and Alok Kumar (forthcoming).   16 
outcomes when investors are not forced to simultaneously make active decisions for both. The 
failure of integration in this context is particularly striking given how closely related the own- 
and matching contribution 401(k) accounts are. Integrating across other types of financial 
accounts is likely to be a more cognitively complicated and time-consuming task, suggesting that 
a similar lack of integration may apply across other financial accounts as well.  
7KLVSDSHU¶VUHVXOWVDOVRKDYHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSXEOLFSROLF\7KHULVNVRIKDYLQJD
portfolio with significant exposure to employer stock have been well-documented (Michael 
Brennan and Walter N. Torous 1999; James M. Poterba 2004; Lisa Meulbroek 2005). After 
bankruptcies in 2001 and 2002 wiped out the 401(k) assets of employees at companies like 
Enron, many employers relaxed rules that restricted the ability of 401(k) participants to diversify 
out of employer stock. The 2006 Pension Protection Act further requires that employee 
contributions to employer stock be immediately diversifiable, and that employer contributions be 
diversifiable after three years. The Pension Protection Act does not cap overall exposure to 
employer stock in the 401(k), and it does not preclude employers from directing their matching 
contributions into employer stock.  
The evidence presented in this paper, along with that in Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
(2005b), suggests that these provisions of the Pension Protection Act and similar company-
sponsored initiatives will have only a small impact on 401(k) employer stock holdings. When 
companies direct contributions to into employer stock²as is the case for 44% of matching 
contributions in the U.S. (Fidelity Investments 2002)²total employer stock holdings by 
participants increase by the entire amount of those contributions. Allowing employees to 
diversify their contributions after they are received does little to reduce employer stock holdings.   17 
  Many companies, while cognizant of the diversification problems that employer stock 
creates for their 401(k) participants, are reluctant to outright eliminate employer stock in their 
plan out of concern that such a measure will lower their stock price. The policies implemented 
by the company studied in this paper reduce employer stock exposure without generating selling 
pressure. The 2003 plan change reduced the employer stock share of contributions going forward 
for new enrollees, while leaving existing employees (and their balances) untouched. 
In 2005, the company went further, but again adopted a regime change that only affected 
contributions going forward. The firm automatically made the matching-contribution flow 
allocation equal to the own-contribution flow allocation for participants who met two criteria: (1) 
they had enrolled before March 2003 and (2) they had never actively chosen a matching-
contribution flow allocation afterwards. The vast majority of participants who enrolled before 
March 2003 met both criteria, and most also remained passive in response to this second plan 
change. As a result, matching contribution flows to employer stock plummeted overnight for 
these individuals to the much lower level that they had selected for their own contributions, with 
no offsetting adjustment to own-contribution flow allocations. If the firm were to make no more 
changes, the fraction of total balances held in employer stock would fall over time, converging 
towards the employer stock allocation of ongoing contribution flows. 
  Of course, there are approaches to reducing employer stock holdings other than the one 
implemented by this company. These include the wholesale elimination of employer stock from 
the investment menu, capping the fraction of balances that can be held in employer stock (at, for 
example, 20%), automatically (with an opt-out) rebalancing employees who have an employer 
stock allocation that exceeds some threshold (such as 20%), or allowing employees to opt into a 
gradual and automatic reduction of their employer stock holdings (Benartzi and Thaler, 2003).   18 
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TABLE 1²IMPACT OF THE PLAN CHANGE ON EMPLOYER STOCK ALLOCATIONS 
  Percent of 2003 Contribution Flow  
Allocated to Employer Stock 
 
Participant sample 
Own  
Contributions 
Matching 
Contributions 
Total 
Contributions 
One-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Feb 2003 enrollees)  23.2%  94.7%  55.9% 
After group (Mar 2003 enrollees)  19.9%  26.8%  22.5% 
Difference  3.3% 
(1.1%) 
67.9% 
(1.1%) 
33.4% 
(1.0%) 
Two-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Jan-Feb 2003 enrollees)  24.6%  96.9%  57.7% 
After group (Mar-Apr 2003 enrollees)  21.7%  29.3%  24.5% 
Difference  2.9% 
(0.8%) 
67.6% 
(0.8%) 
33.2% 
(0.7%) 
Six-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Sep 2002-Feb 2003 enrollees)  26.4%  98.2%  58.7% 
After group (Mar-Aug 2003 enrollees)  24.6%  31.7%  27.4% 
Difference  1.8% 
(0.5%) 
66.5% 
(0.4%) 
31.3% 
(0.4%) 
  Percent of Year-End 2003 Balances  
Held in Employer Stock 
 Participant sample 
Own  
Balances 
Employer Match 
Balances 
Total 
Balances 
One-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Feb 2003 enrollees)  23.6%  94.4%  56.4% 
After group (Mar 2003 enrollees)  19.8%  26.8%  22.4% 
Difference  3.8% 
(1.2%) 
67.6% 
(1.2%) 
34.0% 
(1.1%) 
Two-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Jan-Feb 2003 enrollees)  25.0%  96.4%  58.4% 
After group (Mar-Apr 2003 enrollees)  21.5%  29.1%  24.2% 
Difference  3.5% 
(0.9%) 
67.3% 
(0.8%) 
34.2% 
(0.8%) 
Six-month enrollment groups       
Before group (Sep 2002-Feb 2003 enrollees)  26.4%  97.5%  59.3% 
After group (Mar-Aug 2003 enrollees)  24.6%  31.8%  27.4% 
Difference  1.8% 
(0.5%) 
65.7% 
(0.5%) 
32.0% 
(0.5%) 
Notes: The sample is match-eligible 401(k) plan participants who enrolled in the 401(k) in the months specified and satisfy 
the other sample selection criteria discussed in the text. The standard errors of the differences are reported in parentheses. 
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQV   22 
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FIGURE 1. AVERAGE FRACTION OF ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION FLOW  
ALLOCATED TO EMPLOYER STOCK IN 2003 AND 2004 
 
Note: The averages are equally weighted by person. 
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FIGURE 2. AVERAGE FRACTION OF BALANCES HELD IN EMPLOYER STOCK  
AT YEAR-ENDS 2003 AND 2004 
 
Note: The averages are equally weighted by person.   23 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A. An Upper Bound on the Role of a Short Sales Constraint in the Plan 
Change Effect  
  Suppose that pre-March 2003 enrollees want to reduce their own-contribution flow 
allocation to employer stock in order to compensate for the 100% employer stock allocation in 
their matching contribution flows. However, they are unable to allocate less than zero to 
employer stock in their own-contribution flows, and they are unwilling to reallocate their 
balances after contributions are made. After March 2003, enrollees could allocate less than 100% 
to employer stock in their matching contribution flows, effectively relaxing this short-sales 
constraint. How much of the reduction in total employer stock flow allocations among post-
March 2003 enrollees could be accounted for by this relaxing of the short sales constraint? 
To answer this question, we start with the null hypothesis that the short sales constraint is 
the only reason for the observed differences between the flow allocations to employer stock of 
pre-March 2003 and post-March 2003 enrollees. We then calculate what pre-March 2003 
HQUROOHHV¶WRWDOIORZDOORFDWLRQWRHPSOR\HUVWRFNZRXOGKDYHEHHQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDVKRUWVDOHV
constraint. 
Let  i S  be the actual 2003 total employer stock flow allocation of a pre-March 2003 
enrollee i. Let 
*
i S  be i¶VODWHQWGHVLUHGWRWDOHPSOR\HUVWRFNIORZDOORFDWLRQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKH
short-sales constraint. Note that 
*
i i S S  for enrollees with a positive own-contribution allocation 
to employer stock, since such enrollees are not constrained. We estimate any unobserved 
*
i S  
using the distribution of total employer stock flow allocations among post-March 2003 enrollees. 
Thus,   24 
 
* if own-contribution employer stock share > 0 
(| ) i f   o w n - c o n t r i b u t i o n   e m p l o y e r   s t o c k   s h are = 0 
i
i
post post i
S
S
E S S S
,  (1) 
where  post S  is the 2003 total employer stock flow allocation of post-March 2003 enrollees. 
Using 
*
i S  YDOXHVGHULYHGIURP0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶FKRLFHVZHHVWLPDWHDQDYHUDJH
unconstrained total employer stock flow allocation for the February 2003 enrollment cohort of 
35%. This is substantially higher than the 23% average allocation observed for the March 2003 
enrollment cohort. The estimated unconstrained average for the January to February 2003 
enrollees is 37% when using March to April 2003 enrollees to estimate 
*
i S , which is again 
higher than the 25% average allocation the March to April 2003 enrollment group chose. For 
September 2002 to February 2003 enrollees, the unconstrained average is 40% when using 
March to August 2003 enrollees to estimate 
*
i S . The March to August 2003 enrollees actually 
allocated only 27% on average. In sum, short-sales constraints cannot quantitatively generate the 
drop in total employer stock allocations we observe starting in March 2003. 
Note that short-sales constraints will mechanically appear to explain a substantial fraction 
of the flypaper effect even if no pre-March 2003 enrollee thinks she wants a lower total flow 
allocation to employer stock and the March 2003 plan change effect is entirely due to mental 
accounting. Mental accounting predicts that the distribution of post-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶WRWDO
flow allocations will be similar to pre-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶RZQ-contribution flow allocations. 
Consistent with this prediction, about half of pre-March 2003 enrollees allocated nothing to 
employer stock for their own-contribution flows, and about half of post-March 2003 enrollees 
allocated nothing to employer stock for their total contribution flows. An econometrician 
wanting to confirm the short-sales constraint null hypothesis will count as constrained the 50% 
of pre-March 2003 enrollees who allocated none of their own contributions to employer stock.   25 
The econometrician would then impute 
*
i S  for these ostensibly constrained investors as being 
close to 0, since so many of the post-March 2003 enrollee total allocations are close to 0. 
Therefore, the pre-0DUFKHQUROOHHV¶HVWLPDWHGXQFRQVWUDLQHGDOORFDWLRQVZLOOEH
considerably lower than their actual allocations even if none of the pre-March 2003 enrollees 
were actually thinking that they wanted a lower total employer stock allocation. 
 
APPENDIX B. A Lower Bound on the Prevalence of Ignorant Employees Needed to 
Generate the Plan Change Effect 
  This appendix calculates a lower bound on the proportion of pre-March 2003 enrollees 
ZKRQHHGWREHLJQRUDQWRIWKHPDWFK¶VH[LVWHQFHLQRUGHUWRTXDQWLWDWLYHO\JHQHUDWHWKHSRUWIROLR
effect of the 2003 plan change. 
  Let  i x  be the fraction of participant i¶VNFRQWULEXWLRQIORZWKDWLVKHURZQ
contributions (rather than the employer match). Let 
*
i S  be the desired employer stock proportion 
of the total contribution flow (own plus matching contribution flow), and  i S  be the actual 
employer stock proporWLRQRIWRWDOFRQWULEXWLRQIORZ:KHQLJQRUDQWRIWKHPDWFK¶VH[LVWHQFHD
participant believes that her own-contribution flow allocation equals the total contribution flow 
allocation. In fact, the match is directed entirely to employer stock. Thus, the actual total flow 
allocation to employer stock of an ignorant participant is 
 
* (1 ) i i i i S x S x .  (2) 
 Starting in March 2003, it became impossible for an enrollee to be ignorant of the 
PDWFK¶VH[LVWHQFHEHFDXVHHQUROOHHVKDGWRDFWLYHO\FKRRVHDQDVVHWDOORFDWLRQIRUWKHLUPDWFKLQJ
FRQWULEXWLRQIORZ$VVXPHWKDWDSDUWLFLSDQWZKRLVDZDUHRIWKHPDWFK¶VH[LVWHQFHDOORFDWHVKHU
match and own-contribution flows so that 
*
i i S S . For a participant who would have been   26 
ignorant in the pre-March 2003 regime, the difference in the total employer stock share between 
the two regimes is 
 
* (1 ) (1 ) i i i i S x S x .  (3) 
  What is the resulting population average change in employer stock share? Let p be the 
fraction of ignorant people among pre-March 2003 enrollees. Assuming that non-ignorant people 
would choose the same allocation in both regimes, it is straightforward to show that  
  **
()
( |ignorant) ( |ignorant) 1 ( |ignorant)
i
i i i i
E S
p
E S E x S E x
.  (4) 
Let  x p  be the fraction of participants with an own-contribution share of x who would be ignorant 
in the first regime. By conditioning on x, we can pull it out of the expectations operator and get 
  *
(| )
(1 )[ ( |ignorant, ) 1]
i i
x
i i
E S x x
p
x E S x x
.  (5) 
We can observe  (| ) i i E S x x  directly from the data by calculating the change across regimes 
in total employer stock allocations among people whose own-contribution percent of total 
contributions is x. Therefore, the only unobserved parameter in (5) is 
* (| i g n o r a n t , ) i i E S x x . 
The assumption that 
*
i S  has the same distribution among pre- and post-March 2003 
enrollees imposes restrictions on 
* (| i g n o r a n t , ) i i E S x x . Specifically, suppose a fraction  x p  of 
pre-March 2003 enrollees with  i x x are ignorant. Then there must be some subset of post-
March 2003 enrollees with  i x x which (a) contains exactly a fraction  x p  of all post-March 
2003 enrollees with  i x x, and (b) has an average total employer stock allocation equal to 
* (| i g n o r a n t , ) i i E S x x . Because  x p  is increasing in 
* (| i g n o r a n t , ) i i E S x x , a lower bound on   27 
x p  will minimize this expectation by classifying as ignorant those with the lowest 
*
i S . The lower 
bound  x p is then the lowest x p  that satisfies the equation 
  **
(| )
(1 )[ ( | ,   ( ) ) 1]
i i
x
i i x i x
E S x x
p
x E S x x F S p
,  (6) 
where  x F  is the cdf of the 
*
i S  distribution among post-March 2003 enrollees for whom  i x x. 
  To calculate  x p , we start with the guess that there are no ignorant people for whom 
i x x, so  0 x p . If equation (6) is not satisfied under this guess, we add the post-March 2003 
enrollee with the lowest 
*
i S  value to the ranks of the ignorant and check to see if (6) is now 
satisfied. We continue to add to the ranks of the ignorant from the left of the 
*
i S  distribution until 
(6) is satisfied or there are no more people who can be added, in which case we set  1 x p . 
Now we have, for each x, a lower bound on the fraction of ignorant people. We can 
calculate a lower bound for the ignorant proportion of the entire population by integrating over x: 
  () x p p g x dx,  (7) 
where g(x) is the pdf of the x distribution. We implement the above by discretizing the x space on 
a grid whose values are those that would arise from contributing at an integer contribution rate 
for the entire year. We find that a lower bound on the fraction of participants who must be 
ignorant to fully explain the flypaper effect is 92%, 94%, or 93% using the 2003 contribution 
flows of the one-month, two-month, or six-month comparison groups in Table 1, respectively, to 
estimate the flypaper effect.  28 
APPENDIX C. Additional Tables and Figures 
 
APPENDIX TABLE C1²401(K) PLAN FEATURES 
Eligibility   
Eligible employees  U.S. employees 
First eligible to enroll in plan  Before April 2003: 12 months after hire, minimum 
1,000 hours of work at company 
Starting in April 2003: 90 days after hire 
First eligible to receive matching 
contributions 
12 months after hire, minimum 1,000 hours of work 
at company 
Enrollment default  Not enrolled unless employee opts into plan 
Contributions   
Maximum employee contribution  Before January 2002: 15% of salary 
Starting January 2002: 50% of salary 
Employer match  150% match on first 1% of pay contributed, plus 
50% match on next 4% of pay contributed 
Vesting   
Employee contributions  Immediate 
Employer matching contributions  100% vested upon 3 years of service, 0% before 
Other   
Loans  Available 
Hardship withdrawals  Available 
Investment options  Before January 2002: 6 options, including 
employer stock 
Starting January 2002: 8 options, including 
employer stock 
Source: Summary Plan Description and personal communication with plan administrator. 
   29 
APPENDIX TABLE C2²CHARACTERISTICS OF MATCH-ELIGIBLE 401(K) PARTICIPANTS  
BY PLAN ENROLLMENT DATE 
  Enrolled in 
February 
2003 
Enrolled in 
March  
2003 
Enrolled 
September 2002 - 
February 2003 
Enrolled  
March 2003 - 
August 2003 
Average age (years)  38.3  41.1  38.7  38.2 
Fraction male  59.1%  62.0%  60.6%  61.3% 
Average tenure (years)  2.7  2.4  3.0  2.3 
Fraction married  33.3%  31.6%  33.2%  26.6% 
Avg. annual income  $27,393  $29,069  $28,835  $28,149 
Median annual income  $25,865  $26,000  $26,603  $25,584 
Number of participants  1,015  2,234  6,911  10,753 
 
Notes: The sample is match-eligible 401(k) plan participants who enrolled in the 401(k) in the 
months specified and satisfy the other sample selection criteria discussed in the text. Income 
reported is for calendar year 2004. All other variables are observed at year-end 2003.  
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQV   30 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0
%
>
0
 
t
o
 
<
5
%
5
 
t
o
 
<
1
0
%
1
0
 
t
o
 
<
1
5
%
1
5
 
t
o
 
<
2
0
%
2
0
 
t
o
 
<
2
5
%
2
5
 
t
o
 
<
3
0
%
3
0
 
t
o
 
<
3
5
%
3
5
 
t
o
 
<
4
0
%
4
0
 
t
o
 
<
4
5
%
4
5
 
t
o
 
<
5
0
%
5
0
 
t
o
 
<
5
5
%
5
5
 
t
o
 
<
6
0
%
6
0
 
t
o
<
 
6
5
%
6
5
 
t
o
 
<
7
0
%
7
0
 
t
o
 
<
7
5
%
7
5
 
t
o
 
<
8
0
%
8
0
 
t
o
 
<
8
5
%
8
5
 
t
o
 
<
9
0
%
9
0
 
t
o
 
<
9
5
%
9
5
 
t
o
 
<
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
Percent of contribution allocated to employer stock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
e
n
r
o
l
l
e
e
s
Own contribution, Sep 2002-Feb 2003 enrollees
Total contribution, Mar 2003-Aug 2003 enrollees
APPENDIX FIGURE C1. HISTOGRAM OF THE FRACTION OF ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION FLOWS  
ALLOCATED TO EMPLOYER STOCK DURING 2003 
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APPENDIX FIGURE C2. FRACTION OF PARTICIPANTS WITH  
A NET TRANSFER OUT OF EMPLOYER STOCK DURING 2002, 2003, AND 2004 
 
Notes: To calculate net transfers for a participant, we subtract the dollar value of all his transfers 
out of employer stock during the calendar year from the dollar value of all his transfers into 
employer stock during the calendar year. If this number is negative, then the participant is 
counted as having a net transfer out of employer stock during the year.   32 
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72
Months Since 401(k) Enrollment (Measured at Year-End)
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
N
e
t
 
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
 
O
u
t
2002 2003 2004
APPENDIX FIGURE C3. AVERAGE VALUE OF NET TRANSFERS OUT OF EMPLOYER STOCK,  
CONDITIONAL ON A NON-ZERO TRANSFER DURING 2002, 2003, AND 2004 
 
Notes: To calculate net transfers for a participant, we subtract the dollar value of all his transfers 
out of employer stock during the calendar year from the dollar value of all his transfers into 
employer stock during the calendar year. Averages weight each participant equally. 